A datalog framework for modeling relationship-based access control policies by Pasarella Sánchez, Ana Edelmira & Lobo, Jorge
A Datalog Framework for Modeling Relationship-based Access
Control Policies
Edelmira Pasarella Jorge Lobo
Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya Institucio´ Catalana de Recerca i
Computer Science Department Estudis Avanc¸ats (ICREA)
edelmira@cs.upc.edu Universitat Pompeu Fabra
jorge.lobo@upf.edu
Abstract
Relationships like friendship to limit access to resources
have been part of social network applications since their
beginnings. Describing access control policies in terms
of relationships is not particular to social networks
and it arises naturally in many situations. Hence, we
have recently seen several proposals formalizing different
Relationship-based Access Control (ReBAC) models. In
this paper, we introduce a class of Datalog programs suit-
able for modeling ReBAC and argue that this class of
programs, that we called ReBAC Datalog policies, pro-
vides a very general framework to specify and implement
ReBAC policies. To support our claim, we first formalize
the merging of two recent proposals for modeling ReBAC,
one based on hybrid logic and the other one based on path
regular expressions. We present extensions to handle neg-
ative authorizations and temporal policies. We describe
mechanism for policy analysis, and then discuss the feasi-
bility of using Datalog-based systems as implementations.
1 Introduction
Lately, there has been a growing interest within
the access control community in the concept of
Relationship-based Access Control (ReBAC). Re-
BAC has been used in social networks almost since
their beginnings with the well-known friendship re-
lationship of Facebook as its prototypical example.
Technical awareness of the concept was first reported
in [15], and perhaps the first formalization in the con-
text of social networks was reported in [5]. Describing
access control policies in terms of relationships is not
particular to social networks. For example, a doctor
can look at your medical records if he or she is your
family doctor, or you can read a paper in a reposi-
tory if you are one of its reviewers. At the core of the
model there is a graph in which nodes represent users
and resources, and arcs are labeled with relationships.
Policies are described through paths among nodes in
the graph (e.g., a-friend-of-a-friend represents a path
of three nodes and two arcs). Recently, several pa-
pers have proposed different formalizations for Re-
BAC [4, 7, 8, 13, 17]. In this paper we argue that
Datalog provides a very general framework for Re-
BAC modeling. To support our claim we work with
two of the most sophisticated proposals, one based on
hybrid logic and the other one based on path regular
expressions, and show how complementary features
of the two approaches can be captured in Datalog.
The hybrid logic proposal has been developed in a
series of papers that started with a modal logic as a
modeling language [14], then it evolved into a model
based on hybrid logic [4, 13], and more recently, an
implementation embedded in the open source medical
records system OpenMRS has been reported in [25].
This provides some maturity to the project. The sec-
ond proposal follows the more explicit approach of
defining a path specification language over the re-
lationship graph to write policies. Results for path
based ReBAC are more dispersed since more empha-
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sis has been given to describing other parts of the ac-
cess control systems (see for example [6, 17, 7]) and
less to the formal characterizations of the expressibil-
ity. The work we have chosen for path specification,
[8], is one of the most recent proposals and it incor-
porates features of earlier works with a more precise
description of its expressibility. We then show how
working under the Datalog framework we can eas-
ily extend the model (in ways that it would not be
obvious to do formally in hybrid logic), we can also
do policy analysis and have efficient implementations.
Our contributions in this paper are the following:
1. We introduce a carefully selected subset of Data-
log with equality constraints as a ReBAC policy
specification language which ensures efficient im-
plementations.
2. We then extend the hybrid logic HL of [4] to be
able to express the path expressions of [8] and
show a sound and complete translation of the
extended HL policies into ReBAC Datalog poli-
cies.
3. We extend ReBAC Datalog policies to be able to
express negative authorizations, all easily done
formally because of Datalog.
4. We show how we can also use Datalog itself
to find policy gaps and policy conflicts, and
briefly discuss how to implement conflict reso-
lution strategies.
5. We further extend the language to handle tem-
poral policies.
6. We present precise complexity and expressibility
results of the basic ReBAC Datalog which to-
gether with item (2) characterize the complexity
of the (extended) hybrid logic for ReBAC.
7. We present evidence that policy evaluation can
be done in the order of a few milliseconds us-
ing off-the-shelf Datalog engines with relation-
ship graphs having hundred of thousands of arcs.
We end with some concluding remarks.
2 ReBAC Datalog policies
We are going to closely follow the terminology from
the hybrid logic of [4] in our definitions, but first,
we need to recall some basic notions of Datalog with
constraints. For writing Datalog programs we need
three disjoint (possibly infinite) sets C, Var and P
of constant symbols, variables and predicate sym-
bols. There is a positive integer associated to each
predicate symbol called its airty. A term in Dat-
alog is any variable or constant symbol. An atom
is an expression of the form p(t1, . . . , tk), where p is
a predicate symbol of arity k and t1 through tk are
terms. A literal is any atom p(t1, . . . , tk) or its nega-
tion ¬p(t1, . . . , tk). A negated atom is called a neg-
ative literal; otherwise is called positive. If all the
terms appearing in a literal/atom are constants the
literal/atom is called ground. Constraints are expres-
sions of the form t1 = t2 or t1 6= t2 for any two terms
t1 and t2. Variables will be denoted using capital
letters. A Datalog rule is an expression of the form:
c1, . . . , ck, L1, . . . , Lm → A (1)
where the Li are literals , A is an atom, the ci
are constraints, for k,m ≥ 0. The expression
c1, . . . , ck, L1, . . . , Lm is called the body of the rule, A
the head, and the rule a definition of the predicate
that appears in A. An informal reading of a Data-
log rule is that if there is a ground instance of the
rule (i.e., all variables in the rule are replaced with
constants) for which the constraints in the rule are
valid, and we already know that every ground literal
in the body is true then we can infer that the ground
instance of A in the head of rule is true. A Datalog
program is a finite set of Datalog rules.
The intended meaning of a Datalog program is
given by a set of ground atoms M and is defined in
terms of another set of ground atoms I given as in-
put to the program. The set M contains the (ground)
atoms in I, which are assumed to be true, plus the set
of ground atoms that can be inferred to be true using
the rules and the input I. Ground atoms outside M
are assumed to be false. More formally, given a set
of Datalog rules D, we call the set of all constants
mentioned in D the active language of D. We denote
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by Gr(D) the set of Datalog rules obtained by re-
placing in all possible ways the variables in the rules
with constants in the active language of D. Note that
Gr(D) will be empty if D does not mention any con-
stant. Since ground atoms are also Datalog rules the
same definitions of active language and Gr(.) apply
when we consider a Datalog program and an input.
We will use for the interpretation of constraints the
unique name assumption [24] in which all constants
are assumed to be different from each other. Given
a set of ground atoms M , and an atom A, we write
M |=Datalog A iff there exists a ground instance A′ of
A such that A′ ∈ M . If A is ground and A 6∈ M , we
write M |=Datalog ¬A.
Definition 2.1 Given a Datalog program D and an
input I, a set of ground atoms M is a model of I ∪
D iff M is a minimal set (i.e., there is no a proper
subset of M) for which the following equation holds:
M = {A | c1, . . . , ck, L1, . . . , Lm → A ∈ Gr(I ∪ D),
∀ci : ci is true, and ∀Li : M |=Datalog Li}.
In general, I ∪D may have zero, one or more mod-
els. But as we will see later, policies will have a single
model. In its most simplest form, a query to a Dat-
alog program D with input I is to ask whether a
ground atom A is true in every model of I ∪ D. If
this is the case we will write I ∪ D |=Datalog A; we
write I ∪ D |=Datalog ¬A if ¬A is not true in any
model of I ∪ D. The definition can be extended to
non-ground atoms if I ∪ D has a unique model M :
I ∪ D |=Datalog A iff M |=Datalog A. We can also
have a conjunction of literals L1, . . . , Lm, m > 1, as a
query and we write M |=Datalog L′1, . . . , L′m as an an-
swer if and only if L′1, . . . , L
′
m are ground instances of
the literals L1, . . . , Lm where variables are consistently
replaced across the literals and ∀i M |=Datalog L′i .
Protection states (see [4]) The underlying prin-
ciple behind ReBAC is that from the point of view
of specifying access control policies it is sufficient to
have an abstract representation of the state of the
system to protect built upon three fundamental con-
cepts: the set of objects that form part of the system
(e.g., users, resources), a set of properties that can be
associated to individual objects, and a set of binary
relationships between these objects - a relationship
graph where vertices are objects and edges are labeled
with relationship names. Hence, a protection state in
ReBAC Datalog will be described by a set of ground
atoms where only two predicate symbols are used, a
3-ary predicate rel and a 2-ary predicate prop. The set
of constants C, is partitioned into three disjoint sets,
a set of nominal constants Cn representing names of
objects, a set propositional constants Cp, representing
properties, and a set of (binary) relationship names
Cr. A ground atom of the form rel(n1, r1, n2) can be
member of a protection state only if n1, n2 ∈ Cn and
r1 ∈ Cr. A ground atom of the form prop(n1, p1) can
be member of a protection state only if n1 ∈ Cn and
p1 ∈ Cp. Intuitively speaking, Cn is the set of objects
over which policies will be expressed. It contains the
names of all the objects that can request access to re-
sources, usually called principals, as well as the names
of resources for which principals can request access to.
Cr is the set of names of relationships that can be de-
fined over these objects such as Alice is friend of Bob
(rel(alice, friend, bob): a principal-to-principal rela-
tionship), Bob owns Printer1 (rel(bob, own, printer1):
a principal-to-resource relationship), or Alice is mem-
ber of Department Alpha (rel(alice,member, alpha):
here Alpha is an abstract entity which is used only
to simplify policy specifications, e.g. all members
of Alpha have access to Printer1). A proposi-
tional name in Cp is meant to represent a prop-
erty that a collection of objects may have, like be-
ing a medical doctor, prop(alice, doctor), or a pa-
tient, prop(bob, patient), or the property of being
a Java program, prop(file.jar, java), or a video file,
prop(file.avi, video).1
Policies Policy defines a new relation between prin-
cipals and resources that grants the principals access
to the resources. In ReBAC Datalog policies this
relationship is defined by checking properties of the
objects typically reachable through the relationship
graph either from the principal making the request
or the resource that the principal wants to access as
1Other representations could be used (e.g., to better repre-
sent numerical attributes such as age), but they might never
express relationships between objects. Our model just simpli-
fies the presentation.
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Figure 1: Partial view of the HHC protection state
well as conditions over the paths used to reach these
objects. This means that policies define new rela-
tions in terms of the relationships in the graph that
represents the protection state under consideration.
Before we formally introduce policies let us ex-
amine a few examples based on the following sce-
nario. Assume there is a head hunter company,
HHC, that has a ReBAC system to manage the ac-
cess privileges of its clients to profiles of its pool of
candidates. To this end, HHC uses the LinkedIn
and Facebook profiles of its candidates and clients.
Fig. 1 depicts a partial view of the protection state
held by HHC. In this graph principals are the nodes
alice, bob, carl, eve,mary, rose and will and the nodes
pr b and pr a are resources. Arcs are labeled with
the relationship names profile (of), friend (of) and
contact (of). HHC has a special group of can-
didates qualified as senior advisors depicted inside
dark squares in the graph. The principal alice is in
this group. Hence, the protection state will contain
atoms like rel(bob, profile, pr b), rel(carl, friend, alice),
or prop(alice, senior advisor), etc. HHC policies grant
its clients (requesters) access to the professional pro-
files (resources) from its pool of candidates.
One of the simplest policies HHC could define is
that any LinkedIn contact of the owner of a profile
can access the profile. This policy can be expressed
in Datalog as follows:
Policy1
rel(Res, profile,O), rel(Req, contact,O)→ grant(Req,Res)
Following this policy, if rel(pr b, profile, bob) and
rel(eve, contact, bob) are in the the protection state,
eve is granted access to pr b. It is easy to see that
in the protection state depicted in Fig. 1, the access
is granted, i.e., we are able to infer grant(eve, pr b).
Expressing this simple policy in Datalog allows us to
highlight very basics features of the model. First,
the protection state I will be defined independently
from the set of policies D, and will be the input to
the program to answer queries. Second, typically an
access request comes with at least two parameters:
who/what is making the request and what resource is
being requested. This fact is captured in our formal-
ization by granting to a requester (eve) access to a
resource (pr b), if the query grant(eve, pr b) is true in
I ∪D: I ∪D |=Datalog grant(eve, pr b).
The initial motivation behind ReBAC came from
social networks where policies are expressed in terms
of the relationships between owners of resources and
requesters independent of the resources (think of the
friend relationship in Facebook and the access that
having that relationship grants). Nevertheless, re-
questers ask for access to resources; the ownership re-
lation is kept as a “tacit condition.” Our policy makes
explicit this “tacit condition” by reaching an owner
of a resource through the relationship graph (e.g.,
rel(Res, profile,O)), and then, having identified the
owner, checking conditions in the paths between the
owner and the requester (e.g., rel(Req, contact,O))2.
Now, let’s assume HHC extends the access to any
contact of a contact of the owner of the profile. This
condition is modeled in Datalog by the rule below
with the introduction of a new variable Z:
Policy2
rel(Res, profile,O), rel(Req, contact,Z),
rel(Z, contact,O)→ grant(Req,Res)
2For the sake of explanation, we describe as if the rule body
is evaluated from left to right, but positive literals can be eval-
uated in any order. Datalog engines aim to find the order that
produces the most efficient evaluation.
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From this policy rule and the protection state de-
picted in Fig. 1 we have that I ∪ D |=Datalog
grant(will, pr b). In this case, Z will be instantiated
with mary. This policy alone grants access only to
contacts that are at distance two of the owner of the
profile. To keep access to direct contacts of the owner
we need both policy rules. Several rules represent
the disjunction of the rules, e.g., Policy1 or Policy2.
Notice that neither carl nor rose has access to pr b.
To extend the chain to contacts at distance three we
just need a new fresh variable, for instance, W and
the rule will be:
rel(Res, profile,O), rel(Req, contact,Z),
rel(Z, contact,W), rel(W, contact,O)→ grant(Req,Res)
In general, fresh variables memorize intermediate
nodes reached along the traversal of chains in the re-
lationship graph to later be recalled in another part
of the rule. Observe that evaluating the rule from
left to right, in the sub-query rel(Req, contact,Z),
the variable Req is bound since it occurs in the re-
quest and is “passed” to the program by a query
such as grant(carl, pr b). Then, if there exists an
atom rel(carl, contact, o) in the protection state (like
rel(carl, contact,will)), Z will get bound to o, and
hence, bound in the sub-query rel(Z, contact,W) and
so on. This way of traversing relationships in the
protection state can be followed to limit the traversal
of the graph during policy evaluation to be through
objects related to Req or Res.
Next, assume HHC wants to grant access to senior
advisors’ profiles only when the requester has two
different contacts in common with the advisor. This
policy can be captured by the following rule:
Policy3
rel(Res, profile,O), prop(O, senior advisor),
rel(Req, contact,Z1), rel(Req, contact,Z2),
rel(O, contact,Z1), rel(O, contact,Z2),
Z1 6= Z2→ grant(Req,Res)
This policy introduces two new features. One is an
example of how properties over objects in the pro-
tection state are expressed - the second literal in the
body of the rule. The second one is the use of in-
equalities to express some counting over relationships
that will not be possible without constraints. From
Policy3 and the protection state in Fig. 1, we get
I ∪ D |=Datalog grant(will, pr a). To extend the pol-
icy to three or four contacts we merely need to add
extra predicates to traverse the contact relation with
new variables and then make sure that the variables
get bound to different values by introducing more in-
equalities.
Suppose now that, to minimize conflicts of inter-
est, HHC modifies Policy3, so that these two common
contacts cannot both be personal friends of the senior
advisor. The policy is modified as follows:
Policy4
rel(X, friend,Z1), rel(X, friend,Z2)→ r(X,Z1,Z2)
rel(Res, profile,O), prop(O, senior advisor),
rel(Req, contact,Z1), rel(Req, contact,Z2),
rel(O, contact,Z1), rel(O, contact,Z2),
Z1 6= Z2,¬r(O,Z1,Z2)→ grant(Req,Res)
The new feature in this policy is negation. The neg-
ative condition is defined in two steps. First, a new
rule to describe the condition to be complemented
is defined. Second, the negation of this condition is
added to the policy rule. An important safety con-
dition for the evaluation of negative sub-queries is
that the values to check must be derived positively.
This implies that all variable bindings in the negative
conditions will be limited to values that are men-
tioned in the protection state (the active language).
Hence. the negative sub-query ¬r(O,Z1,Z2) must be
evaluated after all its variables have been bound by
other sub-queries in the rule. Considering Fig. 1, we
can see that I ∪ D |=Datalog grant(will, p a) because
I ∪D |=Datalog ¬r(alice, carl, rose).
The last example introduces path traversals of un-
bounded length. HHC wants to grant access to a
profile to any contact in the network of contacts of
the candidate owning the profile. In this case, the
condition over the network of contacts is that there
must be a chain (of any length) with ending points
the requester and the owner of the resource. This cor-
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responds to checking whether for a requester u asking
to get access to a resource r owned by o, the pair (u, o)
belongs the transitive closure of the contact relation.
The formalization in Datalog is the following:
Policy5.
rel(X, contact,Y)→ r(X,Y)
r(X,Y)→ rtc(X,Y)
r(X,Z), rtc(Z,Y)→ rtc(X,Y)
rel(Req, contact,O), rtc(Req,O)→ grant(Req,Res)
The relation rtc consists of all those pairs that appear
in some path connecting u and o with all the arcs
labeled contact. This relation is defined in Datalog
as a recursive rule (i.e., a rule in which the predicate
in the head of the rule also appears in the body). In
Fig. 1, we have I ∪D |=Datalog grant(rose, pr b).
In the rest of this section we formally define Re-
BAC Datalog policies. In particular, we define poli-
cies that cover all the features highlighted in Policy1–
Policy5.
For writing policies, in addition to the predi-
cates used in protection states, there are three more
types of predicates in the language: a set of bi-
nary predicates called derived relationship predicates,
{nr1, . . . , nrs}, a corresponding set of binary predi-
cates called transitive closure relationship predicates
{tnr1, . . . , tnrs}, and a set of predicates of different
arities called global property predicates {g1, . . . , gt}.
We call nri the basic predicate of the transitive clo-
sure predicate tnri. We call basic literal any literal
of the form rel(t1, r, t2), ¬rel(t1, r, t2), prop(t1, p) and
¬prop(t1, p), where p ∈ Cp, r ∈ Cr, and each ti is ei-
ther a variable or a constant in Cn. Similarly, we call
derived relationship literals, transitive closure liter-
als and global property literals to literals that use
predicate symbols from the appropriate sets.
Definition 2.2 A ReBAC policy D, comprises two
sets of Datalog rules:
1. A non-empty ordered set Dˆ = {r1, . . . , rm} such
that the following conditions hold for every ri:
(a) Every variable that appears either in a neg-
ative literal or in a (positive or negative)
global condition literal in the body of ri,
must also appear in the head or in a posi-
tive relationship, transitive closure or basic
literal in the body of ri.
(b) If ri defines a derived relationship predicate
then every variable that appears in the head
must also appear in either a derived rela-
tionship, transitive closure or basic positive
literal in the body of ri.
(c) If a rule rj defines either a derived relation-
ship predicate or a global property predicate
and the predicate appears in a literal in the
body of ri, then j < i.
(d) Unless ri defines grant, there is no other
rule that defines the predicate defined by ri.
(e) The predicate grant does not appear in the
body of ri.
(f) rm defines the predicate grant.
2. A set ∪si=1TRi, where there is a set TRi for each
derived relationship predicate nri containing the
rules:
nri(X,Y)→ tnri(X,Y)
nri(X,Z), tnri(Z,Y)→ tnri(X,Y)
Condition (1a) is the safety condition for the evalu-
ation of derived predicates discussed in the example
(Policy4). Condition (1b) is also a safety condition.
If variables appear in the head of a rule but not in
the body then whenever a grounding of the rule body
is true, it fixes the value of the variables in the head
that appear in the body. The rest of the variables in
the head can be bound to any constant independent
of the active domain. Condition (1c) limits recursive
definitions to the transitive closures. Condition (1d)
limits disjunctive definitions to the predicate grant.
Condition (1e) prevents grant to be defined recur-
sively on itself and Condition (1f) makes sure the
predicate grant is defined.
We recall that a Datalog program D is hierarchical
if there exists an assignment of integers to the predi-
cate symbols such that for every rule in D the integer
assigned to the predicate in the head is larger than
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the integers assigned to the predicates in the body.
D is called stratified if there is an assignment such
that for every rule in D the integer assigned to the
predicate in the head is larger than or equal to the
integers assigned to the predicates appearing in pos-
itive literals in the body and larger than the integers
assigned to predicates appearing in negative literals.
It is easy to see that any ReBAC policy D is always
stratified and if it does not use transitive closure re-
lations, D can be limited to be just Dˆ, and hence, D
is hierarchical. It is a well-known property of strati-
fied Datalog programs that they have a unique model
[20]. Hence, for any protection state I and ReBAC
policy D there is a unique intended model M(D∪ I).
Definition 2.3 Given a ReBAC policy D and a pro-
tection state I, we say that a permission request (u, r),
from a principal u to access a resource r is granted iff
D ∪ I |=Datalog grant(u, r)
Effective mechanisms to answer Datalog queries exist
and a lot of effort has gone to optimize these methods
since Datalog is the core mathematical foundation
of the relational database model and the database
query language SQL. More about the complexity and
implementation of query answering procedures will
be discussed later in the paper.
3 EHL ReBAC Policies
The content of this section is mainly from Bruns et
al. [4]. In [4] the authors introduced a hybrid logic
HL for the specification of ReBAC policies. In this
logic, from which we have borrowed the terminology
for ReBAC Datalog, there are four disjoint sets of
symbols, a set N of nominal symbols, an infinite set
V of variables, a set I of labels and a set P of propo-
sitional symbols. We denote by n, X, i and p generic
nominal symbols, variables, labels and propositional
symbols respectively. Policies in HL represent proper-
ties involving a fixed number of arcs in a relationship
graphs. Following [8], we extend the logic to also
cover a subclass of properties that can refer to a fi-
nite but unbounded set of arcs described as simple
regular expressions.
Definition 3.1 A formula in the extended hybrid
logic EHL can be:
1. any nominal symbol n, variable X or proposition
p,
2. any term of one of the following forms: ¬φ,
φ1 ∧ φ2, @nφ, @Xφ, and ↓Xφ, piφ, given that
φ, φ1 and φ2 are hybrid formulas and pi a path
expression having one of the following forms:
(a)  representing the empty path
(b) 〈i〉 or 〈−i〉
(c) pi1pi2, for any two path expressions pi1, pi2
(d) pi+, for any path expression pi
The definition of HL formulas [4] considers only simple
path expressions of the form (b) above. Models in
EHL are triples (S, {Ri ⊆ S × S|i ∈ I}, V ), where S
is a non-empty set of nodes, and V : N ∪ P → 2S , a
total function with V (n) being a singleton set for any
n ∈ N . A valuation g : V → S, is a total function
assigning variables to nodes. Let g[X 7→ s] denote the
valuation that mapsX to s and anyX ′ 6= X to g(X ′).
A nominal symbol n will denote the single object in
V (n). The pair (S, {Ri|i ∈ I}) can be interpreted as
a labeled graph in which its vertexes are the nodes
in S and the labeled arcs between the vertexes are
defined by the Ri relations.
Let us revisit the scenario of policies Pol-
icy1–Policy5 from the point of view of mod-
els in EHL. In Fig. 1, the set of nodes S =
{alice, bob, carl, eve,mary, rose, will, pr a, pr b} cor-
responds to the nominal symbols in N , the relations
are profile = {(pr b, bob), (pr a, alice)}, contact
= {(alice, bob), (alice, carl), (bob, mary), (alice,
mary), (alice, rose), (bob, eve), (eve, rose), (mary,
will), (rose, will)} and friend = {(alice, carl),
(bob, carl), (eve, will)}. We assume that V (alice)
= {alice}, V (bob) = {bob}, V (pr b) = {pr b} and
senior advisor is a propositional symbol in P. In
this example, V (senior advisor) = {alice}, how-
ever, in general, for a propositional symbol p, V (p)
is not necessarily a singleton set. The pair (S,
profile ∪ contact ∪ friend) is called a social graph
in [4]. Given an EHL model M , a node s ∈ S and a
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valuation g, a satisfiability relation |= over EHL for-
mulas is defined inductively as follows:
Definition 3.2 1. M, s, g |= X iff g(X) = s
2. M, s, g |= n iff V (n) = {s}
3. M, s, g |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
4. M, s, g |= ¬φ iff M, s, g 6|= φ
5. M, s, g |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff M, s, g |= φ1 and M, s, g |=
φ2
6. M, s, g |= φ1∨φ2 iff M, s, g |= φ1 or M, s, g |= φ2
7. M, s, g |= @nφ iff M, s∗, g |= φ and V (n) = {s∗}
8. M, s, g |= @Xφ iff M, g(X), g |= φ
9. M, s, g |=↓Xφ iff M, s, g[X 7→ s] |= φ
10. M, s, g |= piφ iff M, s′, g |= φ for some (s, s′) ∈
Rpi, where Rpi is inductively defined as follows:
(a) R = ∅
(b) R〈i〉 = Ri
(c) R〈−i〉 = R−1i
(d) Rpi1pi2 = Rpi1 ◦ Rpi2 , where ◦ denotes rela-
tion composition.
(e) Rpi+ = trans(Rpi), the transitive closure of
Rpi.
Items 1-6, 10b and 10c are standard in modal
logics. Items 7-9 are the hybrid operators. Infor-
mally speaking, @t jumps to the node named by t,
i.e. @tφ holds if φ holds at the node identified by
t. In the case of Fig. 1, @alicesenior advisor holds
because after jumping to node alice, it holds that
alice ∈ V (senior advisor).
The term ↓ X binds the variable X to the cur-
rent node, i.e., M, s, g |=↓Xφ holds if φ holds at s
but with the valuation g now interpreting X as s (g
is replaced with g[X 7→ s]). In the case of Fig. 1,
@bob〈friend〉 ↓Xφ, jumps to node bob, then through
the relation friend arrives to node carl, therefore the
variable X is bound to carl and, thus, if X occurs
in the sub-formula φ, it refers to carl. For another
example, let us consider under Fig. 1 the formula
@bob〈contact〉 ↓ X1〈contact〉 ↓ X2〈contact〉 ↓ X3φ.
The evaluation starts at the node bob and it holds
if there exists a chain of contacts of length 3 and the
sub-formula φ holds with variables X1, X2 and X3
bound to the nodes in the chain: mary, will and
rose are examples of such nodes. The usual notions
of free and bound variables in a formula are defined
based on the bindings produced by ↓. Item 3.2.10e
corresponds to the notion of closure for regular ex-
pressions.
As in ReBAC Datalog, policies are evaluated in the
context of a concrete model M (corresponding to a
protection state), and a request (u, r).
Definition 3.3 A policy is an EHL formula that may
have at most Res and Req as free variables and is a
Boolean combination of formulas of the form @Resφ1
or @Reqφ2.
Definition 3.4 Given a policy φ, a permission re-
quest (u, r) is granted in a model M iff
M, s, g[Req 7→ u,Res 7→ r] |= φ
for some s ∈ S and valuation g.
Since Res and Req are the only variables that can oc-
cur free in φ, s and g are irrelevant for granting the
permission. Thus, from the rest of the paper we will
write M, [X1 7→ s1, . . . , Xm 7→ sm] |= φ, when the
only free variables in φ are X1, . . . , Xm. In the pre-
sentation of the logic in [4], the owner of the resource
and not the resource itself is used in the policies since
M is presented as a “social graph”, nodes are re-
stricted to be principals, and policies are assumed to
be associated to a particular resource for which the
owner is known. However, the authors recognize that
more general settings can be defined and refer to the
general case described here as heterogeneous protec-
tion states. Having an action in the request is also
common but we will discuss this later in the paper.
Some examples of EHL policies adapted from [4] are:
@Res〈−profile〉〈contact〉Req (2)
that grants access to any contact of the owner of the
resource.
@Res〈−profile〉〈contact〉(Req ∨ 〈contact〉Req) (3)
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that grants access to a contact or a contact of a con-
tact of the owner of the resource.
@Res〈−profile〉〈contact〉(Req∧senior advisor) (4)
that grants access to a contact of the owner if he or
she is a senior advisor.
@Res〈−profile〉〈contact〉(Req ∧ ¬Bob) (5)
that grants access to a contact of the owner who can’t
be Bob.
@Res〈−profile〉(〈friend〉Req ∧ ¬〈friend〉¬Req)
(6)
that grants access to a friend of the owner if he or
she is the only friend.
A salient feature of the original HL language (and
thus, of EHL and ReBAC Datalog) is the ability to
express graded modalities. Given a positive integer
k, one can write 〈i〉kφ as a shorthand for:
↓X〈i〉↓Y1(φ ∧@X〈i〉↓Y2(¬Y1 ∧ φ∧
· · ·@X〈i〉↓Yk(¬Y1 ∧ ¬Yk−1 ∧ φ) . . .)
which informally says that the formula holds in a
node s iff there are at least k Ri-successors of s at
which φ holds. For example, a formula granting ac-
cess to a requester that has at least three contacts in
common with the profile’s owner is:
@Res〈−profile〉〈contact〉3(〈contact〉Req) (7)
This essentially the same encoding of counting
through inequalities done in Policy3.
The following policy is adapted from [8]:
@Res〈−profile〉(〈member of〉〈−supervise〉)+Req
(8)
that grants permission to any supervisor in the man-
agement chain to access profiles owned by members
of the groups under her management line.
4 From EHL to ReBAC Data-
log
Given an EHL policy defined over sets N , V, I and
P, an EHL model M = (S, {Ri ⊆ S × S|i ∈ I}, V ),
and a policy φ, we want to find an equivalent ReBAC
Datalog policy [φ] and protection state [M ].
Without loss of generality, we assume that all
bound variables in φ are named differently. We also
assume that the model has been fixed. Hence, when
we refer to S, Ri or V in any of the definitions we
are referring to the nodes, relations and the function
V of this model. The following equivalences of HL
formulas are easy to verify:
1. @t1@t2φ ≡ @t2φ;
2. ¬@tφ ≡ @t¬φ;
3. @t(φ1 ∨ φ2) ≡ (@tφ1 ∨@tφ2); and
4. ¬ ↓Xφ ≡↓X¬φ,
for any t, t1 and t2 nominal symbols or variables.
Using these equivalences and De Morgan’s laws we
can normalize EHL formulas by pushing all negations
to be in front of nominal symbols, variables, propo-
sitional symbols or non-empty path expressions, as
well as removing multiple occurrences of @ in front
of any formula. A formula is called normal conjunc-
tive if it does not contain disjunctions, all the nega-
tions appear in front of nominal symbols, variables or
non-empty path expressions and there are no redun-
dant @-operators. A formula is in disjunctive form
if it is a disjunction of normal conjunctive formulas.
It easy to see that every formula has an equivalent
formula in disjunctive form. For the rest of the pre-
sentation we assume that all EHL formulas are in dis-
junctive form. Let the sets C = Cn ∪ Cp ∪ Cr, Var, P
of constant symbols, variables and predicate symbols
be such that N ⊆ Cn, I ⊆ Cr, P ⊆ Cp and V ⊆ Var.
Without loss of generality, we assume that for any
nominal symbol n, V (n) = {n}.3 In what follows, for
the sake of readability, we will use italics in EHL for-
mulas and continue using math serif font for Datalog.
Intuitively, each normal conjunctive sub-formula oc-
curring in a disjunctive formula representing a policy,
can be seen as a partial definition of the policy. This
intuition gives us insights about how to proceed in
order to translate an EHL policy into a ReBAC pro-
gram. Given an EHL formula φ, we define the program
3This is, the syntax of the constant in the language is the
same as value in the model (Herbrand-like).
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[φ] in three steps. Firstly, we provide a mechanism
to translate each normal conjunctive sub-formula of
φ into pairs where the first component is a set of lit-
erals and the second component is a set of ReBAC
rules. Second, for each normal conjunctive formula
in φ, we associate a definition of the binary predicate
grant using each individual translation. Finally, we
join all these grant definitions with the translation
of the EHL model into a Datalog protection state to
get the ReBAC policy and Input to evaluate queries.
The next two definitions formalize these steps.
Definition 4.1 Given a variable X ∈ Var, for any
conjunctive normal EHL formula φ, [φ]X defines in-
ductively a set B of constraints and literals, and a set
R of Datalog rules in a pair (B,R) as follows:
1. [X ′]X = ({X′ = X}, ∅)
2. [n]X = ({n = X}, ∅)
3. [p]X = ({prop(X, p)}, ∅) iff p ∈ P
4. [¬φ]X = ({X′ 6= X}, ∅), iff φ ≡ X ′;
[¬φ]X = ({n 6= X}, ∅), iff φ ≡ n and V (n) = {n};
otherwise
[¬φ]X = ({¬φ¯(V,X)}, {B→ φ¯(V,X)} ∪ R′) iff
[φ]X = (B,R′), V are the free variables appearing
in φ, and φ¯ is a new global property predicate
symbol of arity equal to the cardinality of V plus
1.
5. [φ1 ∧ φ2]X = (B1 ∪ B2,R1 ∪ R2) iff [φ1]X =
(B1,R1) and [φ2]
X = (B2,R2)
6. [@nφ]
X = ({n = Y} ∪ B,R) iff [φ]Y = (B,R), Y
is a new fresh variable from Var
7. [@X′φ]
X = (B ∪ {X′ = Z},R), Z is a new fresh
variable from Var, and [φ]Z = (B,R)
8. [↓X ′φ]X = ({X′ = X} ∪ B,R) iff [φ]X = (B,R)
9. For [piφ]X, when
(a) pi ≡ , then [piφ]X = [φ]X
(b) pi ≡ 〈i〉, then [piφ]X = ({rel(X, i,Y)} ∪ B,R)
if and only if [φ]Y = (B,R) and Y is a new
fresh variable from Var
(c) pi ≡ 〈−i〉, then [piφ]X =
({rel(Y, i,X)} ∪ B,R) if and only if
[φ]Y = (B,R) and Y is a new fresh
variable from Var
(d) pi ≡ pi1pi2, then [piφ]X =
(Bpi1Y ∪Bpi2φ,Rpi1Y ∪Rpi2φ), where
[pi1Y ]
X = (Bpi1Y ,Rpi1Y ) and [pi2φ]
Y =
(Bpi2φ,Rpi2φ)
(e) pi ≡ pi+1 , then
[piφ]X = ({pi+(X,Y)} ∪ Bφ,Rφ∪Rpi1Y ∪Rtc)
if and only if
i. [φ]Y = (Bφ,Rφ), [pi1Y ]
X =
(Bpi1Y ,Rpi1Y ) and Y is a new fresh
variable from Var
ii. pi is a new derived relationship predi-
cate symbol and pi+ its corresponding
transitive closure predicate, and
Rtc = {Bpi1Y → pi(X,Y),
pi(X,Y)→ pi+(X,Y),
pi(X,Z), pi+(Z,Y)→ pi+(X,Y)}
Definition 4.2 For any EHL policy φ = φ′1 ∨ · · · ∨
φ′m in disjunctive form and an EHL model M . Let
φ′i = @Xiφi and [φi]
Xi = (Bi,Ri), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. [φ]
and [M ] define the following Datalog program and its
input:
[φ] =∪mi=1({Bi → grant(Res,Req)} ∪ Ri)
[M ] ={prop(s, p) :p∈P, s∈V (p)}∪{rel(s, i, s′) : (s, s′) ∈ Ri}
As we see, we are considering the ∨ operator sepa-
rately and use Def. 4.1 and Def. 4.2 to get the trans-
lations for policies. Note that Xi is either Res or Req
for every Xi in the definition. The next example il-
lustrates several of the steps in the translation.
Example 4.1 Let us consider a very simple EHL path
expression formula that grants access to a profile to
any direct or indirect contact of the owner of the pro-
file:
φ = @Res〈−profile〉〈contact〉+Req
This policy is already in disjunctive form with a single
conjunctive formula, φ1 = 〈−profile〉〈contact〉+Req
and X1 = Res. Thus,
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[φ1]
Res = [
pi1︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈−profile〉
pi2︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈contact〉+Req]Res = (Bφ1 ,Rφ1)
(Bφ1 ,Rφ1)
Def. 4.1.9d
= (Bpi1Y ∪ Bpi2Req,Rpi1Y ∪ Rpi2Req)
(9)
where (Bpi1Y,Rpi1Y) = [pi1Y ]
Res and (Bpi2Req,Rpi2Req) =
[pi2Req]
Y
(Bpi1Y,Rpi1Y)
Def. 4.1.9c
= ({rel(Y1, profile,Res),Y = Y1}, ∅)
(10)
since [Y ]Y1
Def. 4.1.1
= ({Y = Y1}, ∅)
(Bpi2Req,Rpi2Req)
Def. 4.1.9e
= ({pi+(Y,Y2),Y2 = Req},Rpi2Y2 ∪ Rtc)
(11)
since [Req]Y2
Def. 4.1.1
= ({Y2 = Req}, ∅). Addition-
ally,
[pi2Y2]
Y Def. 4.1.9b, Def. 4.1.1=
({rel(Y, contact,Y3),Y3 = Y2}, ∅).
Hence
Rtc = {rel(Y, contact,Y3),Y3 = Y2 → pi(Y,Y2)
pi(Y,Y2)→ pi+(Y,Y2)
pi(Y,Y3), pi+(Y3,Y2)→ pi+(Y,Y2)} (12)
and
(Bpi2Req,Rpi2Req) = ({pi+(Y,Y2),Y2 = Req},Rtc)
(13)
From (10), (12) and (13) we obtain that the pair
(Bφ1 ,Rφ1) in (9) can be rewritten as
({rel(Y1, profile,Res),Y = Y1, pi+(Y,Y2),Y2 = Req},
{rel(Y, contact,Y3),Y3 = Y2 → pi(Y,Y2)
pi(Y,Y2)→ pi+(Y,Y2)
pi(Y,Y3), pi+(Y3,Y2)→ pi+(Y,Y2)})
and finally, rewriting the pair above we have that
(Bφ1 ,Rφ1) equals to
({rel(Y, profile,Res), pi+(Y,Req)},
{rel(Y, contact,Y2),→ pi(Y,Y2)
pi(Y,Y2)→ pi+(Y,Y2)
pi(Y,Y3), pi+(Y3,Y2)→ pi+(Y,Y2)})
Consequently, by Def.4.1 and Def.4.2 the ReBAC
Datalog program associated to φ, [φ], is
{rel(Y, profile,Res), pi+(Y,Req)→ grant(Req,Res),
rel(Y, contact,Y2),→ pi(Y,Y2)
pi(Y,Y2)→ pi+(Y,Y2)
pi(Y,Y3), pi+(Y3,Y2)→ pi+(Y,Y2)}
Given a protection state, a policy and a permission
request, the next theorem establishes the relationship
between granting permissions in EHL and query an-
swering in ReBAC Datalog programs.
Theorem 4.1 Given an EHL policy φ in disjunctive
form, an EHL model M and a permission request (u, r)
M, [Req 7→ u,Res 7→ r] |= φ iff [M ]∪[φ] |=Datalog grant(u, r)
Proof sketch: the proof is based on the following
lemma:
Lemma 4.1 Let φ be a normal conjunctive EHL for-
mula, M = (S, {Ri ⊆ S × S|i ∈ I}, V ) a model, s a
node in S and g : V → S an assignment such that
M, s, g |= φ. Let X ∈ V ar be a fresh variable not
appearing in φ. Then,
[M ]∪{X = s,B→ q(V,X)} ∪ R |=Datalog q(a,X),
where V is the set of free variables in φ, a is the
assignment of V in g, q is a fresh predicate and [φ]X =
(B,R)
This lemma works over general normal conjunctive
formulas without the restriction imposed in policies
by EHL over free variables. Hence we are able to do
an inductive proof based on the structure of φ. The
case in which φ ≡ pi+φ′ requires a second induction
to cover the transitive closure.
5 From ReBAC Datalog to
EHL
There are two types of ReBAC Datalog policies that
cannot be expressed within EHL. An example of the
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first type of policies is the following:
rel(X, i,Y), prop(Y, p1)→ r(X,Y)
r(X,Y)→ tr(X,Y)
r(X,Z), tr(Z,Y)→ tr(X,Y)
tr(Req,Res)→ grant(Req,Res)
In this policy, a property is checked on every object
in the path between Res and Req. Such conditions
cannot be imposed in a path expression. To limit the
expressibility of ReBAC Datalog to path expressions
and avoid this type of policies, we need simple defi-
nitions of derived relationships. We need to limit the
literals that can appear in the body of a derived rela-
tionship definition to be either positive rel literals or
transitive closure relationship literals – no negation
and no basic or global property literals.
An example of the second type of policies is the
following:
rel(X, i,Y)→ grant(Req,Res) (14)
This says that access is granted if Ri in the protection
state is not empty. To exclude this type of policies we
need to limit the variables that appear in any ReBAC
Datalog rule as follows:
Definition 5.1 For a Datalog rule of the form (1)
we say that:
1. A variable that appears in a literal Lk, k ≤ m,
is seeded iff it also appears either in A or in a
literal Li, i < k.
2. A negative literal is well-seeded iff all its vari-
ables are seeded.
3. A positive literal is well-seeded iff at least one of
its variables is seeded.
The rule is well-seeded iff the literals in its body can be
re-arrange so that all of them become well-seeded and
the variables appearing in the constraints are seeded.
The rule in Eq.(14) is not well-seeded since neither of
the variables, X or Y, appears in the head or in a pred-
icate in the body together with another well-seeded
variable (or constant). Now we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.1 A ReBAC Datalog policy that only
uses simple derived relationship definitions and all its
rules are well-seeded can be translated to an EHL for-
mula. Furthermore, if the policy does not use transi-
tive closure relationships it can be translated into an
HL formula.
Proof sketch: the transformation starts from the
grant rules and is more or less straightforward if it is
done using a well-seeded order traversal of the literals
in the rule by binding a variable with ↓ the first time
the variable is encountered in the rule.
We skip the transformation due to space limita-
tions. In addition, there is no equivalent EHL policies
for most of the extensions discussed in the following
section.
6 Extensions
Permissions are usually granted not to simply access
a resource but to do something with it. For example,
Alice may want access to a file to read and modify it.
Hence the granularity of the permissions should be at
the level of the operation. We can represent requests
as a triple (u, r, a), where u is the principal request-
ing access to the resource r and a is the action the
principal wants to apply to the resource. If the set of
actions is part of S in the protection state, there could
be an “implements” relations over resources and ac-
tions and we can allow three free variables in an EHL
policy φ: Req,Res,A. A request (u, r, a) is granted
under the policy φ iff
M, [Req 7→ u,Res 7→ r,A 7→ a] |= φ
and the grant Datalog rules will be of the form
B→ grant(Req,Res,A)
For example, the policy that let any friend of the
owner of a resource Res to copy Res is written as fol-
lows:
rel(Res, implements, copy),
rel(O, owns,Res), rel(O, friend,Req)→ grant(Req,Res, copy)
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Similar to permission granting rules, negative autho-
rizations can be defined by a formula φ′ such that
access is denied when:
M, [Req 7→ u,Res 7→ r,A 7→ a] |= φ′
The Datalog rule of a negative authorization will be
of the form
B→ deny(Req,Res,A)
Having negative authorizations introduces two prob-
lems. One is what to do if a request is neither granted
nor denied. The second is what to do with conflicting
decisions. The first issue of policy coverage is a se-
mantic issue. We could have a meta-rule to cover the
missing cases but this meta-rule may hide the gaps
of what it could be an incomplete policy otherwise.
In addition, if meta-rules are used one needs to re-
examine the need of complicating the policy specifica-
tion with negative and positive authorizations since
one could, in principle, specify one type of policy and
let the meta-rule cover the other type (like in any
request that is not granted is denied). A more prac-
tical problem is to discover policy gaps. So far, we
have used Datalog programs to answer ground queries
(e.g., grant(u, r, a)). By typing the objects in a pro-
tection state and adding them as part of the input,
we can also ask existentially quantified queries and
do gap analysis with the rule:
prop(Req, principal), prop(Res, resource),
prop(A, action),
¬grant(Req,Res,A),¬deny(Req,Res,A)→ gap(Req,Res,A)
and the query:
D |=Datalog ∃Req∃Res∃A(gap(Req,Res,A))
For analysis, we are assuming that propositions exist
in D typing the constants in the active domain.
There are three complexity characterizations for
query evaluation in Datalog and logic programs.
In one characterization, called data complexity, the
complexity is characterized in terms of the input size
(in our case, the protection state) while the Data-
log program (in our case the ReBAC policies) and
the query are fixed. If, on the other hand, the in-
put is fixed and the program and the query size is
what matters, the complexity of query evaluation is
called program complexity. If both the program and
the input are considered part of the problem size the
characterization is called program+data complexity.
Most of the time in database applications data com-
plexity is considered sufficient since the size of the
data represented by the input is much larger than
the size of the program. We will show in the next
section why this is also a reasonable assumption for
ReBAC policies.
Efficient procedures (PTIME data complexity) exist
not only to decide if the answer is yes or no, but
also to obtain values for the existentially quantified
variables in a query like the one to check for gaps.
Conflicts can be an indication of policy errors.
However, including policy conflict resolution rules
in the semantics of policy evaluation is a common
practice since many times it facilities policy speci-
fication. A typical policy conflict resolution rule is
denies-override-allows. This can be easily incorpo-
rated into Datalog policies by rewriting each granting
access rule as follows:
B,¬deny(Req,Res,A)→ grant(Req,Res,A)
There are many conflict resolution strategies that can
be borrowed from other Datalog models – the inter-
ested reader can find in [18] an extensive study of
authorizations overrides meta-policies and how to ex-
press them in terms of logic programs.
History-based Policies It is common to find ex-
amples of access control policies that depend on the
occurrence of past events. In the context of Re-
BAC, motivated by access control policies found in
community-based collaborations, Fong et al [13] has
extended HL with linear past temporal operators.
Two examples from [13] are:
• A user who has been reported for using inappro-
priate language twice is suspended for further
editing.
• A user who has already created two distinct ob-
jects that have since remained untouched by any
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member of the community (including herself) is
not allowed to further create new objects.
Handling history-based policies in the context of
Datalog has been discussed in [22]. This is achieved
by adding a time argument to all the predicates and
allowing a limited class of time constraints over time
variables. To illustrate how it works we will encode
the second example above:
T1 ≤ T,T2 ≤ T,
rel(U, own,O1,T1),rel(U, own,O2,T2),
¬twoEd(O1,O2,T),O1 6= O2 → deny(U,O, create,T)
T1 ≤ T,T2 ≤ T, rel(O1, edited,U1,T1),
rel(O2, edited,U2,T2)→ twoEd(O1,O2,T)
The intuition behind the rules is that the Ti vari-
ables will be instantiated with time values, and events
like creation of objects, or modifications of objects
will be incorporated into the protection state (these
events can be captured each time a request to execute
these operations is granted/denied) and the state will
evolve over time. Hence, given two objects o1 and o2,
and a fixed time t, twoEd(o1, o2, t) will hold if there
are time points t1 and t2 before (or equals to) t for
which rel(u, edited, o1, t1) and rel(u, edited, o2, t2) are
part of the corresponding states.
A time constraint C is any expression of the form
T1 ⊕ T2 ± c, where T1 and T2 are different time vari-
ables, c is a non-negative real number and ⊕ is one
of {=,≤, <}. These binary relations are interpreted
under the standard order of time. Several constraints
can appear in a rule but all the time variables in the
constraints must also appear either in the head of the
rule or in a literal in the body. In addition, if T is the
time variable appearing in the head, and C1, . . . , Cn
all the constraints appearing in the body, then for
any variable Ti that appears in the constraints, it
must be the case that C1, . . . , Cn |=Datalog Ti ≤ T.
This ensures that policy evaluations do not depend
on “future” states. In the non-temporal case, policies
were evaluated in a protection state. In the case of
temporal policies, all the ground atoms belonging to
the same temporal protection state will be extended
with an extra-argument which will be a time constant
- the same constant in all the atoms. Note that there
is no way to specify absolute values for the Ti’s in
the rules, all times are relative to T which is also a
variable. Similar to [13], policy compliance is defined
in terms of traces. A trace T , is a (possibly infi-
nite) sequence of temporal states 〈S0, S1, . . .〉, such
that constants ti, tj associated to the atoms in states
Si, Sj are such that ti ≤ tj if i ≤ j. Intuitively, T rep-
resents the history of the protection state evolution
over time. How the evolution happens over time is
not relevant for our discussion. Given a set of tempo-
ral policy rules P and a trace T , a permission request
(req, res, a) is granted at time t iff
P ∪ T |=Datalog grant(req, res, a, t)
The crucial point here is that conditions in any rule
refer to properties that must be true either at the
same state where the head of the rule is true or in an
earlier state, and when a permission is requested it is
assumed that the request is to grant the permission
at the current time, i.e., the time when the request
is made. The results in [22] also show how effective
monitors that only keep the historical data required
to evaluate the rules can be implemented instead of
having copies of multiple states. Each update step
executed by the monitor takes time proportional to
the size of the update made to the protection state.
This is in contrast to the results in [13] in which the
steps take time proportional to the size of the state.
The same monitors from [22] can be used for histori-
cal ReBAC if the only time variable that can appear
in the rules representing path expressions is the vari-
able that appears in the head (and thus there are not
temporal constraints in the recursive rules). In other
words path expressions refers to paths in a single pro-
tection state.
7 Datalog as an implementa-
tion
In contrast to policy analysis where time is not so
much an issue, the complexity of access control de-
cisions must consider the effect of the policy, i.e.,
the Datalog rules. Program complexity in Datalog
is EXPTIME-complete [11]. In terms of ReBAC Dat-
alog that would mean that fixing a protection state,
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there is a policy that takes exponential time to eval-
uate with respect to the size of the the policy itself
+ the fixed size of the protection state. This result
applies even if the Datalog rules are well-seeded and
no transitive closure relationships are used. There-
fore, the result also applies to HL policies. The hard-
ness part of the EXPTIME complexity proof depends
on the fact that there are no limitations in the arity
of the predicate relations that can define the Datalog
program - the standard proof uses an encoding of a
deterministic Turing machine that halts in less than
2n
k
steps and uses predicates of arity in the order
of O(n). These are very large programs. In ReBAC
Datalog policies, all predicates of arity > 3 appear in
global condition literals. If we assume a constant k
exists that limits the maximal arity of any predicate
the complexity reduces to NP. The intractability per-
sists because of the inequalities. Inequalities permit
to encode the Hamiltonian path problem [23]. The
encoding of the problem for a path of length n uses n
different variables in the inequalities of a single rule.
Again, this is a very large program. If we can also
assume that the number of different variables that
appear in the inequalities of a single rule does not
exceed a constant k we obtain tractability. Further-
more, the result is tight.
Proposition 7.1 ReBAC Datalog programs with all
predicates with arity ≤ k and rules with constraints
that used ≤ k variables is program+data complete for
P.
This follows directly from the facts that (1) Data-
log programs that are limited to use ≤ k variables
per rule is data+program complete for P [28], and
(2) that using the result that Stratified Datalog with
negation is data complete for P and program complete
for EXPTIME [1] together with the same techniques
from [28], one can show that stratified Datalog pro-
grams with negation that are limited to use ≤ k vari-
ables per rule are also data+program complete for P.
These proofs rest on the fact that any intermediate
result needed to evaluate the rules is no more than
polynomially larger than the input size. In ReBAC
Datalog programs, the size of any derived relation is
a polynomial function on the size of the protection
state. More precisely, if the number of constants in
the protection state is m, the size of a derived relation
can be bound to O(mk), assuming k to be the max-
imal predicate arity. Take, for example, grant(X,Y).
The maximum number of different values that X or
Y can take is m. Hence, the number of ground atoms
is bound by m2. The number of relations defined by
policies (i.e., the number of different predicate names
appearing in the head of at least one rule is limited by
the number l of program rules, therefore, an evalua-
tion of the ReBAC program can be done in O(lmk
2
).
The square is added as an upper bound of rule eval-
uation in case there are recursive rules. In practice,
this number is much smaller, and for a given request
grant(u, r, a), l will be determined by how well we can
index the rules based on u, r, and a, to pull out the
subset of rules that apply to the specific request. One
could use the principal matching rules concept from
[8] or the user-to-user relationship-based access con-
trol model of [7] to organize policies and create an
indexing.
There is a syntactic characteristic of the program
rules that is used to ensure that intermediate results
are kept small: we have already observed how the
propagation of information through variable bindings
happens in the rules. Take, for example, the rule:
rel(Res, profile,O), rel(Req, contact,Z),
rel(Z, contact,O)→ grant(Req,Res)
In terms of database operations, the evaluation of
the rule requires two joins. We know that at the
moment of evaluation, values for the variables Req
and Res will be fixed. Therefore, the evaluation of
rel(Res, profile,O) will produce a single value for O.
The expected number of values for Z returned by the
evaluation of rel(Req, contact,Z) can be estimated by
the typical values of contact list sizes given that Req
is fixed. Similarly, the expected number of values
for Z in the evaluation rel(Z, contact,O) can be esti-
mated. This is called the selectivity of the evaluation,
the smaller the expected number of values, the higher
the selectivity. Given that the selection operations in
databases can be done much faster than the joins,
modern database systems do query planning before
query evaluation to find the right order to evaluate
the joins. If, for example, the order is first to do
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the join rel(Req, contact,Z), rel(Z, contact,O), before
doing the second join with rel(Res, profile,O) a pro-
jection over O is done in the relation obtained from
the join rel(Req, contact,Z), rel(Z, contact,O) and the
joint relation can be discarded before doing the
(semi) join with rel(Res, profile,O). In this case there
can never be a relation with more than m2 tuples
during the computation. In contrast, creating the
(Res,O,Req,Z) joint table could in principal gener-
ate a relation with m4 tuples. This dependency of
shared variables is known as a Sideway Information
Passing (SIP) optimization and it is fundamental for
the Magic Sets optimization technique applied to re-
cursive Datalog rules. Given that the evaluation of an
access control decision in the Datalog program is al-
ways answering a ground query this optimization will
be very effective, essentially transforming the query
answering into a goal oriented procedure. This means
that the search space will be very likely limited to
nodes in the graph that are reachable from the con-
stants passed as arguments in the query which, in
many cases, will be much smaller than m. Further-
more, SIPs are useful for implementing and maintain-
ing view materialization - this is a pre-computation of
rule evaluations that generalizes the concept of catch-
ing suggested in [9].
There are several Datalog systems available to test
implementations. Nevertheless, we are not presenting
experimental evaluations since [21] already reports
an evaluation and comparison of a few systems that
includes experiments with rule sets with exactly the
characteristics of ReBAC Datalog policies. Instead
what we will do is to present the relevant results and
put them in context with the experimental evaluation
of a Java implementation of a subset of EHL policy
evaluator reported in [25].
Since the publication of [21] there have been sev-
eral new releases of the systems and the results of the
experiments have been updated twice using the newer
versions. The discussion below is based on the 2011
report [12]. The machine where all the experiments
were conducted was a dual core 3GHz Dell Optiplex
755 with 4 gigabytes of main memory. It was running
Ubuntu 7.10 with kernel 2.6.22. Although the exper-
iments were ran using four different Datalog systems
and no a single one outperformed the others in all
the evaluations, we will only report the results ob-
tained using Ontobroker [21] since it is the system
that better performed in the majority of the tests.
Ontobroker is also written in Java. We start review-
ing the results of evaluating the following set of rules:
b1(X,Z), b2(Z,Y)→ a(X,Y)
c1(X,Z), c2(Z,Y)→ b1(X,Y)
c3(X,Z), c4(Z,Y)→ b2(X,Y)
d1(X,Z), d2(Z,Y)→ c1(X,Y)
The base relations that would correspond to the pro-
tection state were c2, c3, c4, d1 and d2, represent-
ing atoms of the form rel(X, c2,Y), rel(X, c3,Y),
rel(X, c4,Y), rel(X, d1,Y), rel(X, d2,Y). We will dis-
cuss the results for experiments that were conducted
using 50K and 250K randomly generated arcs from
a fixed set of 1000 nodes. For the query a(X,Y), in
which both variables were free, with 50K arcs the
time to evaluate the query was 8.807sec. With 250K
the evaluation took 59.259sec. At first glance, these
times do not look encouraging. Nevertheless, if in the
query we bind the first argument (e.g., a(1,Y)) the
time to answer the query with 50K arcs reduces to
7msec. With 250K arcs the time reduces to 21msec.
Tests with the second argument bound (e.g., a(x, 2))
resulted in similar performance of 50K arcs, but only
5msec for 250K. This difference is explained by the
fact that Ontobroker does query analysis and builds
a cost model to decide what optimizations to use in-
cluding the order to do the joint operators, the al-
gorithm to use for the execution of each of the join
operations as well as selectivity analysis. This im-
provement of at least three orders of magnitude shows
the effect of limiting the search to reachable objects.
For ReBAC, we can take the best of the times since
queries grant(u, r), will have both arguments bound.
It is difficult to make a direct comparison to the re-
sults reported in [25] for several reasons. One is that
the number of arcs used in[25] is 2 orders of magni-
tude larger (30000K) than for the experiments in [12].
Furthermore, in [25] the arcs were not randomly gen-
erated, and the machine was more powerful: it had 8
cores of faster CPUs and 4 times more memory. They
report having averages of 37msec for the policies most
similar to the program above. These 37msec are an
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average over policy evaluations that could require the
executions of no joints at all and up to a maximum of
three joints. This is in contrast to the query a(.) that
has four joins. Evaluations with larger data sets can
be done but it is worth noting that database sizes do
not correlate directly with time to execute queries -
not only the second argument bound query evalua-
tion ran faster for the 250K set than the 50K, but
the time that took to run queries of the form b2(X,Y)
and b1(X,Y) with one of the arguments bound using
the 50K set and the 250K set took about the same
time in each case, less than 4msec for b1 and less than
20msec for b2.
[12] also reports experiments over the evaluation of
transitive closure rules:
par(X,Y)→ tc(X,Y)
par(X,Z), tc(Z,Y)→ tc(X,Y)
The results here are also remarkable. The largest in-
put size consisted of 2000 nodes and 1M par arcs ran-
domly generated. Two types of input were generated,
for graphs with and without cycles. For queries with
no bindings (tc(X,Y)) the times for evaluation were
87.3sec for data with no cycles and 200.9sec for data
with cycles. Binding the first argument made very
little difference, 86.5sec and 197.17sec respectively.
But if the second argument was bound the results
were 25msec for no cycles and 16msec for data with
cycles. This demonstrates the effects of the Magic set
optimization that re-writes the programs to take ad-
vantage of the bound arguments and the SIP derived
from the rules syntax.
[25] does not have implementation for path expres-
sions. The observation to make is that despite of
the fact that the system in [25] was specially devel-
oped for EHL its performance is not particularly better
than using an off-the-shelf Datalog system that also
includes regular path evaluations, giving evidence of
the excellent performance of Datalog systems con-
trary to the belief that they are not suitable for high
throughput access control implementations.
A final observation about implementations: there
is a result in parallel complexity that may explain
some of the experimental results for the transitive
closure above. A Datalog program is called linear if
and only if each rule has at most one occurrence of the
predicate in the head appearing in the body. Recall
that a decision problem is in the NC complexity class if
it can be solved in polylogarithmic time on a parallel
computer with a polynomial number of processors. It
is known that the data complexity of linear Datalog
is in NC [26] and amenable to parallelization. Note
that except for negation, ReBAC programs are linear.
Among the optimization considered by Ontobroker
is the use multiple cores and threading to parallelize
query evaluation.
8 Final remarks
Research on access control policy languages has been
extensive and logic programming has been a popular
modeling choice [18, 2, 19, 16, 3]. But writing cor-
rect policies and developing correct and intuitive im-
plementations of policy management systems are not
easy tasks [10]. The attention ReBAC has received
in the access control research community comes from
the fact that it provides an expressive yet tractable
model to intuitively capture the meaning of the “sub-
jective” policies people may have in mind. The goal of
this paper has been to show the benefits of using Dat-
alog as a developing framework. Modeling ReBAC in
Datalog is natural since Datalog is a good language
to describe and talk about properties of graphs which
is the essence of ReBAC. From a practical point of
view there are two good reasons for choosing Data-
log: Datalog specifications are easier to implement,
and implementation techniques have been around for
many years. These are complemented by extensive
results in computational complexity which we were
able to use almost directly to establish the express-
ibility and complexity results of ReBAC Datalog poli-
cies (and by Propositions 5.1 & 7.1, the complex-
ity of HL and EHL policy evaluation). This does not
mean that Datalog must be the syntax the policy
author uses to write policies. ReBAC Datalog can
be thought as target compilation language of a more
user-friendly language for authoring.
There is a striking similarity between the def-
initions of properties and relationships in HL and
the definitions of concepts and roles in Description
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Logics (DL). This has been our motivation for the
“meta-relation” rel, as in rel(O, friend,R), instead of
friend(O,R). This is a typical domain-independent
representation of DL roles in Datalog. Since hash in-
dexes can be built in relation columns, accessing the
related items of a particular object can be done very
efficiently. There is a lot of research in the DL com-
munity to develop fast deduction algorithms for very
large data sets (see, for example, [27]). Developing a
ReBAC model based on one of the tractable DLs is an
avenue of research worth exploring. But what is more
important to note is that many advances for high
throughput Datalog systems have been driven by the
interest of the Semantic Web community of using
Datalog-like languages for Ontology reasoning. Even
if a specialized ReBAC policy evaluator is developed
all the experience gained developing high through-
put Datalog systems cannot be ignored and will be
of tremendous impact.
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